COMMENTS
BITING WITHOUT TEETH: THE CITIZEN SUBMISSION
PROCESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
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†

The Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free
1
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), recently ratified by the U.S. Con2
3
gress and signed by the President, has been a controversial piece of
the Bush administration’s economic policy. The treaty is principally
aimed at expanding the market for U.S. business opportunities within
the region and facilitating economic development in Central America
4
5
and the Dominican Republic, but its critics charge that its environ-
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1
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-Costa Rica-Dom. Rep.-El Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar., Jan. 28, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514
(draft text) [hereinafter CAFTA-DR]. The most recent text of the Agreement, signed
by the seven signatories on August 5, 2004, and to which this Comment refers, is
avaiable at http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/
Section_Index.html.
2
See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, S. 1307, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005) (enacted) (expressing Senate
approval of CAFTA-DR); Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, H.R. 3045, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005) (enacted) (expressing House approval of CAFTA-DR). CAFTA-DR was negotiated and
ratified under the “fast track” authority granted to the President in the Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-210, div. B, tit. XXI, §§ 21012113, 116 Stat. 933 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3813 (Supp. II 2002)); see infra note
130 (explaining fast track legislation).
3
Press Release, White House, President Signs CAFTA-DR (Aug. 2, 2005), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050802-2.html.
4
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, pmbl. (identifying these among the goals of the
treaty); Press Release, White House, supra note 3 (same).

(1229)

1230

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
6

[Vol. 155: 1229
7

mental chapter is toothless—that the citizen submission process
lacks sufficient standards and enforcement mechanisms to avoid
derogation by the treaty’s member states in the area of environmental
8
protection. This Comment suggests that such despair is premature.

5

See, e.g., Sierra Club, CAFTA’s Impact on Central America’s Environment,
http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/cafta/cafta_centralamerica.asp (last visited Mar. 23,
2007) (focusing on the lack of binding authority to enforce CAFTA’s “environmentally-friendly language”). Some authors also claim that the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), the Environmental Side Agreement
to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which provides similar dispute resolution structures to those in CAFTA-DR, compare CAFTA-DR, supra note 1,
arts. 17.7-.8 & 20 with North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 14, 15 & pt. 5, Sept. 8-14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter
NAAEC] (authorizing complaints to the Secretariat that a party is not enforcing its environmental laws and establishing dispute settlement procedures), includes inadequate
protections for environmental and labor interests. See, e.g., Paul Stanton Kibel, The Paper Tiger Awakens: North American Environmental Law After the Cozumel Reef Case, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 395, 479 (2001) (proposing that North American environmental law be enforced on par with North American trade law). But see Kal Raustiala,
The Political Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA Environmental Side
Agreement: The CFC as a Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31, 56 (1995) (arguing
that the use of NAAEC-type provisions can actually reduce environmental regulation).
CAFTA-DR, similar to NAFTA, arguably provides less protection to labor interests than
to environmental interests. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 16 (failing to provide an
analog to the environmental submission procedure for labor interests); North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 8-14, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1499 (same).
6
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17 (affirming the importance of environmental
protections and establishing enforcement processes).
7
See infra Part I.C.2 (describing the citizen submission process).
8
The United States, see supra notes 2-3, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua have ratified the treaty. See Jenalia Moreno, El
Salvador on Board with CAFTA: First Central American Nation To Implement Pact, HOUST.
CHRON., Feb. 25, 2006, at D1 (“Four other nations [apart from El Salvador] involved in
the trade talks—Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic—are
still making legislative and regulatory changes to adhere to the agreement. However,
Costa Rica’s legislature has still not ratified the deal.”). CAFTA-DR will enter into
force upon the agreement of the signatories, see CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, arts.
22.5(1)(b), 22.5(2) (stipulating that the treaty will enter into force once the United
States and another of the signatories agree on a date; remaining signatories may join
enforcement ninety days after completing certain formalities), and El Salvador has become the first of the signatories to implement the agreement with the United States,
see Moreno, supra (stating that the agreement was to take effect between the United
States and El Salvador on March 1, 2006). The Bush administration has been pressuring the holdouts by making known its intent and desire to bring the treaty into force as
soon as possible. See Rick Eyerdam, U.S. Set To Act on CAFTA, J. COM. ONLINE, Dec. 20,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 20630366 (“The United States is prepared to implement
[CAFTA-DR] once [the other signatories] ‘have taken sufficient steps to complete
their commitments’ under the trade pact, says Christin Baker, spokesperson of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.”). CAFTA-DR has become politically divisive in
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9

Similar protests were lodged against the analogous provisions of
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC), the side agreement to the North American Free Trade
10
Agreement (NAFTA). The critics’ arguments have merit; these trea11
12
ties protect foreign investors and trade interests by establishing uniform international standards and binding enforcement measures
13
without including similar environmental provisions, thus creating
the possibility of a race to the bottom among member states as they
erode environmental protections to compete for investment and
trade. Nevertheless, despite the disequilibrium between the investment and trade provisions on the one hand, and the environmental
provisions on the other, the record of environmental submissions under NAAEC demonstrates that these supposedly toothless environmental provisions can actually substantially offset the tendency toward
an environmental race to the bottom that these treaties could otherwise create.

Costa Rica, which has yet to ratify the treaty. See Olga R. Rodriguez, Arias Holds Slim
Lead in Costa Rica Election, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 7, 2006, at A10 (noting that the previous frontrunner, Oscar Arias Sanchez, was down to “a razor-thin lead” partially due to
his support for CAFTA-DR).
9
See, e.g., Jonathan Graubart, Giving Meaning to New Trade-Linked “Soft Law” Agreements on Social Values: A Law-in-Action Analysis of NAFTA’s Environmental Side Agreement,
6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 425, 426 (2001-2002) (“[A]ctivists have creatively
used the nonbinding citizen submissions to place added political pressure on their
home governments and thereby boost ongoing political and legal campaigns at home
on such issues as protecting fish habitat and stopping the continuous dumping of toxic
wastes.”); Kibel, supra note 5, at 395 (“[NAFTA] is treated as binding and enforceable,
whereas [NAAEC] is treated as non-binding and aspirational.”); Kal Raustiala, Police
Patrols and Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 389-90
(2004) (arguing that the NAAEC citizen submission process regulates signatory compliance via “police controls” (review by a centralized bureaucracy) and “fire alarms”
(investigations triggered by private actors)).
10
NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 1; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. NAAEC was an essential addendum to the NAFTA treaty regime, and their memberships are coterminous.
11
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.5, 10.15-.27 (providing a “minimum standard of treatment” for investments and allowing for investing parties to institute arbitration proceedings against CAFTA-DR signatories); NAFTA, supra note 10, arts. 1105,
1115-1120 (same).
12
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 3 (stipulating the removal or reduction of various barriers to trade); NAFTA, supra note 10, pt. II (same).
13
Compare Parts I.A & I.B, infra, with Part I.C, infra. Domestic labor standards are
similarly endangered by CAFTA-DR, but because the internal politics and international
treatment of the issue are sufficiently dissimilar to those of environmental concerns,
the labor law analysis falls outside the scope of this Comment.
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To prevent such a race, it is sufficient to establish uniform international standards and an effective means for deterring states from
noncompliance with those standards, but these terms need not be explicit in the treaty’s text. Indeed, given the tenor of international en14
vironmental law in general, and the preferences of the United States
15
in particular, such explicitly strong environmental terms would likely
prevent ratification. The solution must instead achieve the necessary
environmental protections in a politically acceptable manner, and this
Comment argues that in the hands of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) acting strategically, the regime established by NAAEC and, by
extension, CAFTA-DR’s environmental chapter, will do just that.
In its analysis, this Comment employs Kal Raustiala’s conception
of international agreements as having three conceptually distinct features, two dealing with form—legality and structure—and one address16
ing substance. According to Raustiala, legality refers to the formality
with which an international agreement creates an international legal
obligation, varying from legally binding contracts to nonlegally binding
17
pledges. Raustiala uses structure to measure the effectiveness of the
agreement’s enforcement mechanisms; an agreement can be either
18
weak or strong in this regard. Finally, the substance of an agreement
refers to the coercive nature of its obligations and can range from deep

14

See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
581, 601 (2005) (“Many scholars have noted the variety in depth of international
agreements. Environmental accords, for example, are often shallow. Trade agreements are generally thought to be deeper, as are many arms control accords.”).
15
See infra notes 116-135 and accompanying text.
16
See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 581. Using these factors to establish a rational
delineation between “hard” and “soft” law, Raustiala argues that
the notion of “soft law” agreements is incoherent. Under the prevailing approach, pledges are being smuggled into the international lawyer’s repertoire
by dubbing them soft law. Just as frequently, scholars declare that contracts
containing vague or imprecise commitments are actually soft. In so doing,
these commentators are conflating the legality of agreements with structure
(in particular, enforcement features) or substance (e.g., rule precision), or effects with causes (i.e., looking to behavioral effects to demonstrate international law’s existence).
Id. at 582. More robust definitions of each of these three variables are addressed in
the discussion of this paper’s analytical framework. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
17
Raustiala, supra note 14, at 581, 583-84. Raustiala refers to nonlegally binding
agreements as those to which states agree without creating a formal record of the
agreement. Id.
18
Id. at 585.
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19

to shallow. Among these variables, Raustiala notes that trade-offs occur as states negotiate agreements, such that it is unusual for each of
the three characteristics to be employed in the fullest sense in the
20
same agreement. In environmental agreements, the trade-offs gen21
erally involve legality and substance. These trade-offs relate to political feasibility: the likelihood that contracting states will adopt and
comply with a particular treaty provision. Agreements that reflect
trade-offs are likely to enjoy political feasibility.
In these terms, this Comment argues that while the environmental
provisions of NAAEC and CAFTA-DR are legally contractual and
structurally strong, they cannot be substantively deep without becoming politically infeasible. Strategic NGOs, however, have the ability to
effectively deepen the treaty’s substance while maintaining political
feasibility by exploiting CAFTA-DR’s structural provisions. This thesis
has value beyond the specific NAAEC/CAFTA-DR context; it offers a
practical understanding of the potential effectiveness that seemingly
shallow substantive treaty provisions can have if properly understood
by strategic political actors.
Part I explains the identical features of NAFTA and CAFTA-DR
that, without mitigating factors, could cause a race to the bottom by
22
the signatories in enforcing their environmental standards. Part II
establishes a framework for analysis of political feasibility, and then
moves on to apply that rubric to the NAAEC/CAFTA-DR context.
Part III then argues that by establishing a citizen submission process
and a network of environmental regulators, the treaties’ environmental provisions enable NGOs to effectively deepen the substantive
environmental provisions to a level sufficient to address the race to
the bottom.

19

Id. at 584-85.
See id. at 582 (claiming that domestic politics inform the choice between form
and substance, and that “the widespread preference for contracts often unduly weakens the substance and structure of multilateral agreements”).
21
See id. at 596 (“In many areas of cooperation—such as the environment, [inter
alia]—the preference for contracts is pervasive. Indeed, in these areas negotiations
that end in a pledge are often dubbed failures, while those that produce contracts,
though subject to criticisms about substance or structure, are largely considered successes.”).
22
The term “environmental standards,” as used in this Comment, refers to both
state laws and regulations in force, and to the enforcement of these rules by the proper
state authorities.
20
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I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL RACE TO THE BOTTOM
This Part discusses the race to the bottom in environmental pro23
tection that may result from the imbalance among the substantive
protections found in both NAFTA and CAFTA-DR. The danger associated with these treaties derives from their encouragement of regional trade and investment activities via substantively deep protections while employing comparatively shallow provisions in the
environmental chapter. Among the explicit goals of the treaties are
“[enhancing] the competitiveness of [the signatories’] firms in global
markets,” “[establishing] clear and mutually advantageous rules governing . . . trade,” and “[ensuring] a predictable commercial frame24
work for business planning and investment.” To meet these goals,
the treaties outline specific uniform standards to be observed with re25
26
gard to cross-border investment and trade, and provide for a dispute resolution procedure to protect parties involved in these activi27
ties. Parties seeking to make environmental claims, however do not,
enjoy similar substantive protections under CAFTA-DR and NAAEC;
28
neither treaty provides international environmental standards nor
29
30
31
an enforceable private right of action for such claims.

23

As noted above, this Comment adopts Kal Raustiala’s terminology regarding the
form and substance of international agreements. Under Raustiala’s approach, the
“substance” of an international agreement includes the provisions of that agreement
and the extent to which they require a change in the ex ante member state practice. See
Raustiala, supra note 14, at 584 (noting that substantive depth is “the extent to which
[an agreement] requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence” (quoting George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News
About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996) (alteration in original))).
24
NAFTA, supra note 10, pmbl.; CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, pmbl. The preambles
of these treaties indicate that these commercial goals are to be achieved in a context of
environmental responsibility. See NAFTA, supra note 10, pmbl. (pledging to undertake
“each of the preceding in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation”); CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, pmbl. (seeking to protect and “preserve the environment and enhance the means for doing so, including through the conservation of
natural resources in their respective territories”).
25
See infra Part I.A.
26
See infra Part I.B.
27
See infra Part I.A-B.
28
See infra Part I.C.1.
29
The term “enforceable” is inherently plastic, and as will be seen, identifies the
substantive core of what seems to be an attack on the treaties’ structural provisions. See
infra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
30
See infra Part I.C.2.
31
Richard Revesz identifies these as two of the obstacles to counteracting the environmental race to the bottom. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
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This Comment focuses not on the efficacy of the environmental
provisions in combating the baseline environmental problems, but
rather on the treaties’ ability to counteract the derogative pressures
introduced by the environmental race to the bottom. As an agree32
ment involving the United States and six developing economies,
CAFTA-DR sets the stage for such a downward race among the Central
33
American states that would multiply the impulse to discount domestic environmental protections. By increasing the cross-border mobility
34
of investment dollars and goods among the member states via deep
substantive protections, CAFTA-DR encourages the developing

Regulation: Lessons for the European Union and the International Community, 83 VA. L. REV.
1331, 1341 (1997) (claiming that international environmental regulation can be difficult because the international community has only a “weak capacity for centralized environmental standard-setting and virtually no capacity for centralized environmental
enforcement”). Revesz also identifies the pronounced wealth gap as an additional factor that complicates international environmental regulation. Id. (“[T]he differences
in wealth and economic development are far more salient in the international community than in federal systems.”).
32
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, pmbl. (identifying the signatories as the governments of the Republic of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, the Republic of El Salvador, the Republic of Guatemala, the Republic of Honduras, the Republic of Nicaragua, and the United States of America).
33
For brevity, I include the Dominican Republic when I refer to “Central American states.”
34
Of course, these investment opportunities are currently available to domestic
investors in the United States and other states, but the CAFTA-DR investor protection
provisions seek to increase foreign investment by providing specific assurances to foreign investors. These provisions augment the incentive for states seeking foreign investment to ignore environmental concerns in order to secure that investment. See infra Part I.A (detailing the foreign investment protections afforded under CAFTA-DR
and NAFTA). Only three of the CAFTA-DR signatories—El Salvador, Honduras, and
Nicaragua—have negotiated bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with the United States
that would afford investor protections outside of the CAFTA-DR provisions. See United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD Investment Instruments
Online, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch____779.aspx (last visited Mar.
23, 2007) (cataloging all bilateral investment treaties). Of these, only the BIT with
Honduras has entered into force. See Investment Treaty with Honduras, U.S.-Hond.,
July 1, 1995, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-27 (2000). Additionally, each CAFTA-DR signatory is a member of the WTO, see World Trade Organization, Understanding the
WTO—Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007) (listing the membership of the WTO),
and the extent to which the CAFTA-DR trade provisions will have a derogative effect
on environmental protection is mitigated by the trade rights secured to all members of
the WTO. WTO, Understanding the WTO—Principles of the Trading System,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Mar.
23, 2007) (outlining the general trading principles between member states of
the WTO).
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economies to compete for these newly available, but finite, sources of
economic growth. The danger is that this competition may incite the
Central American states to downgrade their domestic environmental
protections in an attempt to decrease the costs of local economic activity, therefore attracting a greater proportion of foreign investment
35
and trade.
The Sections below detail the specific provisions in
CAFTA-DR and NAFTA that allow the possible environmental race to
the bottom to occur—namely, the establishment of deep substantive
protections for trade and investment, but shallow substance in the environmental provisions.
A. Investor Protections
NAFTA and CAFTA-DR provide deep substantive protections to
investment interests by setting standards to be achieved by host states
36
with regard to foreign investment, and establishing a dispute resolution procedure to which private interested parties have access and
37
from which they may seek an enforceable decision. The scope and
quality of these protections indicate the signatories’ intent to assure
investors that they will have the opportunity to litigate any grievances
that may arise from their foreign investment, thus encouraging free-

35

Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2341, 2343 (1996) (arguing that in the federal context, a justification for
federal environmental regulation is that it removes the temptation for states to “induce
geographically mobile firms to locate within their jurisdictions” by offering “them
suboptimally lax environmental standards so as to benefit from additional jobs and tax
revenues”).
36
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.3-.14 (providing for various substantive protections for investing parties); NAFTA, supra note 10, pt. II (same).
37
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.15-.27 (providing for arbitration procedures
at the behest of foreign investors against the state of investment); NAFTA, supra note
10, ch. 20 (addressing institutional arrangements and dispute settlement procedures).
Similar investor rights were established in the NAFTA treaty. See NAFTA, supra note
10, arts. 1115-1138 (allowing investors to bring arbitration proceedings against the
state of investment). Some activists have seized upon this imbalance of private access
to dispute resolution as grounds for opposing CAFTA-DR altogether. See, e.g., Press
Release, Sierra Club, Response to the U.S.-Central American Environmental Cooperation Agreement (ECA): Statement by Margrete Strand, Senior Representative of the
Sierra Club’s Responsible Trade Program (Feb. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.sierraclub.org/pressroom/releases/pr2005-02-24.asp (“CAFTA follows the
failed path of NAFTA and expands the ability of multinational corporations to challenge environmental and public health measures in secret trade tribunals for cash
compensation.”).
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38

dom of capital among member states. In short, these provisions aim
to promote cross-border investment by creating nonpreferential, uni39
form standards of protection.
40
Both treaties afford investors the benefits of national treatment,
41
42
most-favored-nation status, and minimum standards of treatment.
Each of these provisions exemplifies the definite and binding quality
of investor protections, which must be uniformly adopted and enforced against each signatory. The national treatment article ensures
that foreign investors enjoy the same protections that benefit domes43
tic investors, and the most-favored-nation article assures signatories’
investors that no other international investors will enjoy extra protec44
tions or assurances not available to investors from signatory states.
In addition to these comparative investor protections, the treaty also
establishes minimum standards for investors, guaranteeing those protections “in accordance with customary international law, including
45
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”
38

See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, pmbl. (listing the overall goals of the agreement,
which include the promotion of economic integration between the member states);
NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 102 (declaring that NAFTA aims to “eliminate barriers to
trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and services between the
territories of the Parties” and to “create effective procedures” for implementing the
agreement and its objectives, including procedures to resolve disputes between member states).
39
For an analysis of the unequal procedural protections afforded to investors and
environmental interests in the NAFTA/NAAEC context, see Chris Tollefson, Games
Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE
J. INT’L L. 141, 146-47 (2002).
40
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.3; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1102.
41
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.4; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1103.
42
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.5; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1105.
43
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.3(1) (“Each Party shall accord to investors
of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances,
to its own investors with respect to . . . investments in its territory.”); NAFTA, supra note
10, art. 1102(1) (including a similar provision).
44
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.4(1) (“Each Party shall accord to investors
of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances,
to investors of any other Party or of any non-Party with respect to . . . investments in its
territory.”); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1103(1) (including a similar provision).
45
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.5(1). These terms are further defined in subsequent sections to include access to judicial proceedings and a baseline level of police
protection. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.5(2)(a)-(b). The NAFTA minimum
standards are phrased differently. See NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1105(1) (“Each Party
shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”).
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The investment provisions also give explicit procedural rights to
46
47
private foreign investors, allowing them to bring timely claims
48
against the host state itself for a breach of a substantive duty conferred by NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, or an investment authorization or
49
agreement. Initially, disputes are to be addressed via informal “con50
sultation and negotiation,” but if these prove unsuccessful, the aggrieved investor is allowed to institute arbitration proceedings against
the state under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) or the United Nations Commission on International
51
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules.
These arbitration proceedings, if
they yield a favorable decision for the complainant, result in a binding
52
cash award or restitution to the private party, which can then be en-

46

Claimants can bring an action either on their own behalf or derivatively on behalf of a corporation. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.16(1)(a)-(b); NAFTA, supra
note 10, arts. 1115-1138. These claims must have resulted in harm to the claimant.
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.16(1)(a)(ii), (b)(ii); NAFTA, supra note 10, art.
1116(1).
47
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.18(1) (stating that claims must be “submitted to arbitration” within “three years [of] the date on which the claimant first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the breach alleged . . . and knowledge that the claimant . . . or the enterprise . . . has incurred loss or damage”); NAFTA,
supra note 10, art. 1116(2) (“An investor may not make a claim if more than three
years have elapsed from the date on which the investor first acquired, or should have
first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the investor has
incurred loss or damage.”).
48
In these investment cases, the substantive obligations owed to the foreign investor, see supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text, are assurances of legal treatment within
the host state. Therefore, a breach of these obligations would entail a change in the
laws of the host state, thus rendering the state itself the appropriate target of litigation.
49
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.16(1)(a)(i), (1)(b)(i).
50
Id. art. 10.15.
51
Id. art. 10.16(3); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1120. If both the respondent’s and
the investor’s home states are signatories to the ICSID Convention, then that Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedures for Arbitration Proceedings govern the dispute. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.16(3)(a); NAFTA, supra note 10, art.
1120(1)(a). If only one of the two states involved has signed the ICSID Convention,
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules will apply. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art.
10.16(3)(b); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1120(1)(b). Finally, if neither state is party to
the ICSID Convention, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules will be used. CAFTA-DR,
supra note 1, art. 10.16(3)(c); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1120(1)(c). ICSID and
UNCITRAL are systems of ready-made arbitration rules allowing for private parties to
make claims against states for breaching agreements. See generally INT’L CENTRE FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS, AND RULES, (Apr.
10, 2006), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
52
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.26(1)(a)-(b); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1135.
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forced under the NAFTA or CAFTA-DR dispute resolution chapters,
53
or various other international agreements.
These investment protections indicate that all signatories—both
developed and developing—find it beneficial to protect investors’
rights under these treaties. U.S. investors seek valuable opportunities
with minimal risk, and the protections described in the NAFTA and
CAFTA-DR investment chapters allay investor worries by establishing
both a uniform baseline of investor entitlements as well as a reliable
enforcement procedure. Conversely, signatories with developing
economies benefit from these investor protections because they help
attract investment dollars and thereby spur economic stability and
54
growth.
B. Trade Protections
As in the investment context, both NAFTA and CAFTA-DR provide deep substantive protection through explicit trade standards, as
well as a dispute resolution process for trade grievances that may provide enforceable results. Similar to the investment provisions, these
trade provisions are in the mutual interest of the signatories, encouraging broader markets for domestic goods. By agreeing to this regime, however, states with weak domestic businesses put these firms at
risk of failing because of increased market competition with firms
from other treaty member states.
55
While the treaties include situational trade rules, the baseline
protections are similar to those rules established in the investment
context. Regarding trade in goods, each signatory must ensure that

53

CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.26(6), (8), (9); NAFTA, supra note 10, art.
1136. Once a plaintiff obtains a decision in her favor from one of these arenas, she
can then enforce that decision in the defendant state’s domestic court system.
54
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua each stand to benefit economically by providing investor protections to the
United States. Foreign direct investment (FDI), the cross-border “investment by one
firm in another with the intention of gaining a degree of control over that firm’s operations,” PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: RESHAPING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC MAP IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 51 (4th ed. 2003), is a means for enlarging a state’s domestic economy via corporate mergers and asset sharing. The United States is a leading source of
FDI, and the six other parties to CAFTA-DR rank among the lowest in amounts of FDI
received. See id. at 55 fig.3.14 (depicting the global distribution of both outbound and
inbound FDI).
55
See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 3.5-.29 (governing various trade circumstances among the signatories); NAFTA, supra note 10, chs. 4-8 (same).
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56

the others’ firms will enjoy national treatment, and the parties have
agreed to scheduled tariff rollbacks on products originating from
57
other member states. The provision on trade in services includes as58
59
surances of national treatment, most favored nation status, and the
guarantee that local incorporation will not be required for a service
60
provider to do business within a signatory’s borders.
The trade chapters of these treaties do not indicate a specific procedure for the assertion of trade rights; therefore the overall dispute
61
resolution procedures control any trade-based controversies. Under
62
the respective dispute resolution provisions, the complaining state
may decide whether to bring the action under the NAFTA/CAFTADR procedure, the WTO Agreement, or other “free trade agree63
ment[s] to which the disputing Parties” belong. These choices afford the complaining state access to an arbitration process that would
enable a successful plaintiff to enforce its rights through a propor64
65
tionate suspension in trade rights until restitution is made.
56

CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 3.2; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 301.
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 3.3; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 302.
58
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 11.2; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1202; see also supra
notes 40, 43, 56 and accompanying text.
59
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 11.3; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1203.
60
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 11.5; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1205.
61
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.2; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 2004; see also
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, annex 20.2 (providing explicit recourse to the article 20 procedure for instances of “nullification” of provisions in articles 3 and 11, inter alia).
62
In this dispute resolution context, “[p]arty means any State for which this
Agreement is in force.” CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 2.1. This definition is implicit in
the NAFTA definitions. See NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 201 (stating, for example, that a
“person of a Party means a national, or an enterprise, of a party”). Therefore, private
parties—namely individuals and private organizations—have no standing under Chapter 20, and must instead rely on diplomatic protection to assert any trade-based claims.
See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liecht. v. Guat.) 1955 I.C.J. 4, 26 (Apr. 6) (requiring state
espousal of individual claims as a prerequisite for litigation in international tribunals).
63
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.3(1). The NAFTA agreement only references
the WTO proceedings as alternatives. See NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 2005 (stating that
parties have recourse to GATT settlement procedures).
64
See WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 62 (2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_text_e.pdf (describing the circumstances under which an aggrieved party may institute trade sanctions against a party failing to make restitution).
65
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.16 (allowing for the proportional suspension of trade benefits by the complainant against the noncompliant party if the complainant has not received restitution); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 2019 (same). For a
definition of proportionality as used in this context, see UNDERSTANDING THE WTO,
supra note 64, at 62 (noting that sanctions should be limited to avoid impinging on
other sectors of trade).
57
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The provisions for trade protection, though slightly different, remain indicative of a strong signatory commitment to the enforcement
of trade rights. Substantively, the effect of these protections is similar
to those on the investment side, guaranteeing a minimum interna66
tional standard of treatment to incoming goods and services. The
main difference from the investment chapter is the dispute resolution
process. Here, private parties must convince an eligible state to es67
pouse the claim in order to gain access to international adjudication.
C. Environmental Protections
Unlike the investment and trade provisions, the NAAEC and
CAFTA-DR environmental protection schemes seem substantively
shallow: they provide neither an international standard for environmental protection, nor a dispute resolution process by which private
parties seeking to enjoin or punish environmental malfeasance may
sue for an order stating such events have occurred. These deficiencies give rise to specific holes in environmental protection that must
be remedied if the chapter is to allay its detractors’ concerns and effectively combat the pressures detrimental to the environment introduced by the deep substance of the treaties’ investment and trade
provisions.
1. Lacking International Environmental Standards
Neither treaty establishes hortatory environmental standards; they
instead require only that the member states “effectively enforce [their
68
own] environmental laws.” This stipulation is further weakened by
the treaties’ “recogni[tion] that each [member state] retains the right
to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial,
regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions regarding
69
the allocation of resources.” CAFTA-DR does not completely ignore
66

The trade-in-goods provisions do not secure most favored nation status among
the signatories, but the rollbacks of tariffs do provide an international rule that is not
subject to domestic policy choices.
67
International adjudication, by definition, allows only states to be party to an action. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
68
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.2.1(a); see also NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 5.1
(stating essentially the same proposition).
69
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.2.1(b); see also NAAEC, supra note 5, pmbl.
(“Reaffirming the sovereign right of States to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental and development policies . . . .”).
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the possibility of opportunistic behavior, reminding the signatories
that
it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental laws. Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such
laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections afforded in
those laws as an encouragement for trade with another [signatory], or as
an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or re70
tention of an investment in its territory.

This precatory standard, generally referred to as “aspirational,”
provides little international accountability to environmental protection. Because the signatories commit only to “strive” to enforce their
own environmental standards, complete adherence is unnecessary. If
the domestic government decides that its environmental laws and
regulations are too stringent to allow economic growth, it retains the
ability under this treaty regime to unilaterally reduce its environ71
mental protection efforts, free from enforceable sanction. As compared to the treaty-based standards provided in the chapters on investment and trade, the sovereignty retained by the signatory
governments in the environmental context provides a clear opportunity for each member state to sacrifice environmental protection as
they pursue economic growth, thus fueling the environmental race to
the bottom.
2. Lacking an Enforceable Private Right of Action
Unlike the investment and trade provisions, the environmental
citizen submission process does not guarantee an enforceable right of
action to private parties; the outcome of a citizen submission will have
72
no legally binding effect on any member state. In order to make a
73
submission under this enforcement procedure, a private party must
70

CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.2.2.
Of course, the decision to reduce legal environmental protection is subject to
any internal legislative and regulatory processes that may exist.
72
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8 (stipulating that “publication of the factual record is the end result of a successful submission”); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15
(same).
73
Potential parties under these environmental provisions include both natural
and legal persons, indicating that individuals or organizations would be able to bring
submissions under this chapter, regardless of their relation to the harm alleged. See
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(1), (2)(f) (limiting possible claimants to those who
hold status as “a person of a Party”); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14.1(f) (providing for
71
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claim against a fellow NAAEC or CAFTA-DR signatory that the state
75
has failed to “effectively enforce its environmental laws.” After satis76
fying basic procedural requirements, the party must submit its claim
77
to the treaty’s secretariat for consideration. This official has the discretion to reject the submission as frivolous, or to proceed with the
78
inquiry by asking the state complained against for a response. After
receiving the response, the secretariat, if convinced that the issue is
credible, may ask permission of the treaty’s Environmental Affairs
79
80
Council to proceed with the production of a factual record. Because these Councils are composed of domestic administration officials from each signatory, the individual’s claim of environmental
claims by a “person or organization residing or established in the territory of a party”).
Other signatories are allowed to instigate consultations regarding environmental
nonenforcement, which could eventually lead to Chapter 20 arbitration between two
member states. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.10(1), (6), (8) (establishing the
procedure for collaborative environmental consultations); NAAEC, supra note 5, art.
22 (same). The NAAEC consultation provision has never been used. E.g., Kibel, supra
note 5, at 416 n.104 (stating that the Article 22 mechanism “remains untested” (quoting David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experience, 32
TEX. INT’L L.J. 163, 188 (1997)).
74
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(3); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14.1.
75
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(1), (3); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14.1.
76
See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(2)(a)-(f) (requiring the complainant’s
identification, a sufficient level of evidence, and a showing of genuine grievance, inter
alia); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14.1(a)-(f) (providing essentially the same procedural
requirements).
77
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(1); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14. The
CAFTA-DR secretariat’s powers are not explicitly delineated, but presumably the position is similar to the NAAEC secretariat. Compare CAFTA-DR supra note 1, art. 17.7(1)
& n.1, (4) (designating a secretariat and giving it powers to determine if a submission
merits a response from a party), with NAAEC, supra note 5, arts. 11-15 (describing the
duties of the NAAEC secretariat).
78
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(4); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14.2. The criteria for rejecting the submission appear in sections (a)-(d) of articles 17.7(4) and
14.2, respectively.
79
An Environmental Affairs Council is a group comprised of “cabinet-level or
equivalent representatives of the Parties, or their designees.” CAFTA-DR, supra note 1,
art. 17.5(1); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 9.1 (same). This Council is a network of highlevel government officials, experienced in the area of environmental regulation, and
politically accountable to the signatory government that they represent. For an expert
discussion of the power of such regulatory networks, see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER 36-64 (2004) (describing regulators’ roles in the disaggregated
international system).
80
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(1)-(2); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15.1-.2.
The Environmental Affairs Council may approve the preparation of a factual record
“by a vote of any Party,” CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(2), or by a “two-thirds vote,”
NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15.2.
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nonenforcement is vulnerable to a politically motivated refusal to al81
low the factual record to be produced.
If authorized, the secretariat then commences an investigation
into the events giving rise to the submission, and may consult information from a variety of sources, including “interested persons” or “in82
dependent experts.” Once completed, a draft of the factual record
must be submitted for review by the Environmental Affairs Council,
83
which will allow any signatory to comment. Having received comments, the secretariat then prepares a final draft of the factual record,
which the Environmental Affairs Council can, within sixty days, ap84
prove for publication.
A successful citizen submission culminates
with the publication of a factual record detailing the environmental
harms caused by lax or absent governmental oversight or remedy.
The factual record can include no legal judgment as to whether the
85
state failed to enforce its environmental laws or regulations. There is
no provision forcing the offending governmental actors to remedy the

81

CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(2), (7) (requiring a vote of the members of
the Council before ordering the production of a factual record); NAAEC, supra note 5,
art. 15.7 (same).
82
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(4); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15.4 (similar).
83
The commenter need not be a party to the issue, but these comments must be
made within 45 days of the draft’s submission to the Environmental Affairs Council.
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(5); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15.5.
84
The Environmental Affairs Council may, for any reason, deny publication of the
factual record by refusing to hold a vote. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(7) (requiring a “vote of any Party” to authorize publication of a factual record); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15.7 (requiring a two-thirds vote). Under CAFTA-DR, the Environmental Affairs Council’s decision to allow publication of the Factual Record must
“consider the final factual record in light of the objectives of [Article 17] and the
ECA.” CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art 17.8(8). The “ECA” is the Environmental Cooperation Agreement, a side agreement to CAFTA-DR outlining a set of nonbinding environmental goals, and establishing the “Dominican Republic-Central America-United
States Environmental Cooperation Commission” (Environmental Cooperation Commission). See generally Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Environmental Cooperation Agreement, available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/
42423.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007) [hereinafter ECA]. The Environmental Cooperation Commission, like the Environmental Affairs Council, is composed of environmental officials from each signatory, but its powers are only consultative. Id. art. IV.
Instead of, or in conjunction with, authorization of the factual record, the Environmental Affairs Council may recommend action to the Environmental Cooperation
Commission to resolve the conflict. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(8). NAAEC
does not provide for an analogous commission.
85
E.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8 (3) (“The preparation of a factual record by the secretariat . . . shall be without prejudice to any further steps that may be
taken with respect to any submission.”); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15(3) (same).
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omission, or even requiring the provision of restitution to the parties
harmed.
The substantive imbalance between these treaties’ investor and
trade protections and their environmental provisions is stark. By providing for both internationally established standards that are immune
from unilateral change and procedural protections leading to decisions binding on the signatory governments in the context of investment and trade, the treaties confer enforceable rights to counteract
those pressures that encourage a downward trend in environmental
protection. On the other hand, the shallow environmental provisions
fail to confer comparable rights upon those seeking to redress an environmental harm. This imbalance disadvantages environmental interests. An environmental claim against a state is undermined by the
treaties’ deference to the domestic policymaking procedures free
from binding international sanction. This incongruence creates both
the opportunity and incentive for parties to pursue economic growth
by reducing environmental regulatory standards, thus creating a more
attractive and profitable business environment.
II. TOWARD A SOLUTION
Having highlighted the race to the bottom that these treaty regimes introduce, the question becomes: how can international law
counteract these pressures? This Part argues that a complete surrender of state sovereignty over environmental issues to an international
body is both unlikely and unnecessary. Although critics of the citizen
submission process claim that it is ineffectual because it lacks both the
conventional provisions of binding international standards and an effective private right of action to adequately prevent state participation
86
in an environmental race to the bottom, these perceived shortcomings are not fatal, and indeed may not be shortcomings at all. As will
be seen in Part III, it is not necessary to emulate the standards and dispute resolution systems provided elsewhere in the treaty in order to
avert the race.
This Part considers the drawbacks of alternative regimes of environmental dispute resolution, comparing them to the theoretical ability of the citizen submission process and its concomitant regulatory

86

See supra note 37 (describing dispute resolution procedures and an imbalance
of private access to dispute resolution).
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networks to afford protection to environmental interests in
NAFTA/NAAEC and CAFTA-DR member states. Part I noted that a
uniform international standard and enforceable right of action are
key aspects of a regime that combats the environmental race to the
87
bottom, and that these attributes are absent in the environmental
provisions of NAAEC and CAFTA-DR. I argue that, while such substantively deep provisions may indeed remedy the problem, they are
not politically feasible in the context of international environmental
law. More effective would be a regime that achieves functional depth
in a politically acceptable manner, and I argue that in the hands of
politically aware environmental NGOs, such a regime regime is established by both of these treaties.
A. An Analytical Framework
To establish an analytical framework for the relative political feasibility of alternative regimes of environmental regulation, it is helpful
to begin with Raustiala’s concepts of legality, structure, and substance.
Raustiala argues that international agreements should be examined
across these three conceptually distinct variables, two dealing with
88
form—legality and structure—and one addressing substance. Legality refers to the difference between contracts and pledges, which is essentially whether the parties intend their agreement to create a formal
89
or informal international legal obligation. Contracts are more formal agreements, usually in writing, that purport to be binding, while
pledges include unofficial “‘[g]entlemen’s agreements’” among state
90
leaders.
The other variable dealing with form is the agreement’s
87

See supra Part I.C.
See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 583-85 (describing the three variables in detail).
89
Id. at 581 (“Legality refers to the choice between legally binding and nonlegally
binding accords (for simplicity, I term this a choice between contracts and pledges).”
(footnote omitted)) Raustiala cites language in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties as a definition of a legally binding (contractual) treaty. Id. at 583; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2, para. 1(a), opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“‘Treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in
a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation . . . .”).
90
Raustiala, supra note 14, at 583. Some scholars argue that legality is more than
simply writing the provisions down in treaty form. See, e.g., C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge
of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850,
851 (1989) (“The use of a treaty form does not of itself ensure a hard obligation . . . .
[I]f a treaty is to be regarded as ‘hard’, it must be precisely worded and specify the exact obligations undertaken or the rights granted.”). Raustiala responds that the im88
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structure—the “rules and procedures created to monitor parties’ per91
formance”—which can be weak or strong. Examples of these structural provisions include both information-gathering mechanisms and
92
systems designed to “deter and punish noncompliance.” The final
characteristic, substance, determines whether these mechanisms affect
93
compliance. Raustiala measures the substance of an international
agreement by its depth, or the extent to which the agreement requires
“‘states to depart from what they would have done in its absence.’
Some accords are deep: they require states to make major changes in
policy. Others are shallow: they codify what states are already doing
94
or demand only minor changes in behavior.” Based on these obser95
vations, Raustiala claims that since states generally prefer to comply
with their international obligations—because they are “moderately
96
risk averse” regarding uncertain future circumstances —they usually
require shallow substantive provisions when entering into a contrac97
tual agreement dealing with environmental issues. This leads to a
trade-off between the legal and substantive aspects of an agreement.
With Raustiala’s insights in mind, I turn to reevaluate the purpose
of the environmental provisions and the functions they must perform
in order to prevent an environmental race to the bottom. It is conceivable that international institutions would directly regulate the actions of private parties in some circumstances; this happens most notably in the areas of international criminal and human rights law,

precision and flexibility of treaty terms do not affect the legality of the treaty itself, but
rather speak to the treaty’s substance. Raustiala, supra note 14, at 588.
91
Raustiala, supra note 14, at 585.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 584.
94
Id. (quoting Downs, supra note 23, at 383).
95
A state’s “preference” refers to the combination of “domestic preferences” (the
aggregate preferences of domestic constituencies), “domestic institutions” (the
branches of domestic governments that must approve an accord), and “relative state
power” (the distribution of power among contracting states). Raustiala, supra note 14,
at 595-99.
96
Id. at 595.
97
Id. at 601. Raustiala does not claim that every contract will result in shallow substance—only those dealing with a subject matter that is backed by a domestically weak
group, which generally describes environmental interests. Id. at 603 (“Environment
and human rights accords are generally shallower than trade, investment, and arms
control accords, in part because of the differential political power of the domestic
groups that demand cooperation in these areas. We generally observe a positive correlation between depth and legality when the domestic demandeurs of cooperation are
politically privileged, and a negative correlation when they are not.”).
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where individuals can be held accountable internationally for the
98
breach of a treaty provision. Other international frameworks regulate private parties indirectly instead, by binding states to implement
the necessary regulations; the prominent example in this category is
99
100
the WTO.
For reasons of political feasibility, the NAAEC and
101
CAFTA-DR environmental rules tend to follow the WTO model.
This understanding that international environmental regimes incentivize state obedience, rather than directly targeting the conduct of individuals, informs the analysis of possible alternative mechanisms.
The goal, then, is not to provide immediate relief or damage awards
to the victims of specific instances of environmental malfeasance; such
102
tort claims are generally handled by domestic courts.
Rather, the
immediate purpose of the international environmental dispute resolution mechanism is to ensure that states respect the international
103
commitments they have made regarding environmental protection.

98

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment,
¶ 5 (Nov. 22, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/
mil-ai040421-e.htm (accusing Slobodan Milosevic as an individual for the violation of
international human rights law).
99
See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 2, art. 3, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (stipulating that this dispute governs only the enumerated
agreements, all of which are signed by, and binding on, states only).
100
Regimes delegating substantive discretion to an international regulatory regime are substantively deep, because doing so may require the enforcement of environmental norms that are different than those the state would choose to enforce. According to Raustiala, this is unlikely to happen in an environmental context, due to the
weakness of domestic environmental groups. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying
text.
101
NAAEC and CAFTA-DR indicate that they are not meant to bind individuals as
defendants, but rather to govern the actions of states. The role of individuals and
groups of individuals is limited to challenging governments’ compliance with the treaties. For instance, the treaties do not provide for damages to be paid by losing defendants, see CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8 (indicating that the end result of a successful submission is the publication of a factual record); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15.7
(same), and any “person of a Party” has standing irrespective of whether she suffered
any harm, see CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(1) (stating that “[a]ny person of a
Party may file a submission” under the environmental chapter); NAAEC, supra note 5,
art. 14.1(f) (providing that a submission must be “filed by a person . . . in the territory
of a Party”).
102
See, e.g., Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394, 395 (D. Mass. 1989)
(recounting the claim by residents of Massachusetts against a corporation for negligently “causing toxic waste to infiltrate the municipal water supply”), aff’d, 900 F.2d
388 (1st Cir. 1990).
103
Even though the primary goal of the environmental regime is to police state
behavior with respect to environmental standards, this does not exclude a secondary,
nonpreclusive goal of restitution to individuals who have been harmed by state nonen-
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Toward this objective, legality explains little about environmental
agreements, due to the overwhelming preference among environmentalists for the formality and perceived security found in a written
104
treaty.
Theoretically, pledges might generate more effective environmental protection, but until more states heed Raustiala’s recom105
mendation that they more frequently employ international pledges,
or until environmental interests can gain more domestic political
clout, environmental regulations, like those in the NAAEC and
CAFTA-DR, are likely to operate exclusively as international contracts.
Similarly, the effect of structure on environmental agreements is
limited. Critics of CAFTA-DR and NAAEC tend to obfuscate the line
between structure and substance in their commentaries. Since these
critics disapprove of both the environmental standards and the submission process established by the treaties, it seems that these viewpoints assess both form and substance. Nevertheless, these assertions
are analytically distinct. Arguments against the submission process
have little to do with its existence or effectiveness in identifying cases
of environmental nonenforcement, and, rather, denounce the structure because it is not “enforceable” by sufficiently substantial en106
forcement provisions.
Thus, the structural arguments collapse into
the substantive. What remains are charges that the environmental
provisions of NAAEC and CAFTA-DR lack adequate substantive depth
to protect against the race to the bottom. This trade-off between legal
107
formality and substantive depth exactly parallels Raustiala’s analysis.
The “legal-substantive trade-off” adds the political feasibility of uniform standards and deep enforcement provisions to the list of factors
necessary to effectively combat the environmental race to the bottom.
This term is meant to capture the current reality that environmental
forcement; it merely indicates that such recompense is not necessary to the regime’s
purpose.
104
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting that politically weak groups
(like environmental groups) often insist that shallow agreements be reinforced with
legal formality).
105
See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 614 (“Scholars, statesmen, and activists alike
have too often assumed that contracts are the best choice for cooperation, and pledges
a feeble substitute. But pledges can have surprising power.”).
106
See, e.g., Tseming Yang, The Effectiveness of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement’s Citizen Submission Process: A Case Study of Metales y Derivados, 76 U. COLO. L.
REV. 443, 458 (2005) (arguing that in the Metales case, the production of a factual record was ineffective in preventing the environmental harm); see also supra note 5 (discussing similar complaints by the Sierra Club).
107
See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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treaties in force are not simultaneously contractual and substantively
deep; therefore, any environmental treaty (contractual by definition)
must include shallow provisions to be considered politically feasible.
Revisiting the two factors identified in Part I, it is clear that to critique the lack of uniform international environmental standards and
seemingly unenforceable structural provisions in NAAEC and CAFTADR is to attack the treaties’ substance. Therefore, such arguments
must be assessed in light of Raustiala’s legal-substantive trade-off.
First, establishing specific international environmental standards is
substantive in that such standards would provide explicit benchmarks
for state action. Second, the necessity of an effective private right of
action is a misnomer; it is essentially a substantive requirement
couched in terms of procedure. To give binding legal effect to the
right of action demands deeper substantive enforcement provisions
that will remedy cases of nonconformity once they are identified by
the action; this can only be achieved by deepening the treaty’s substance. With a grasp of the variables, their goals, and the tradeoffs involved, the inquiry now turns to whether an international environmental regime can establish these two deep substantive measures,
even though they are absent from the treaties’ explicit terms, while at
the same time satisfying the third constraint of political feasibility.
B. Determining Political Feasibility in the NAAEC/CAFTA-DR Context
Determining the effect of the legal-substantive trade-off on a given
international agreement requires an assessment of what levels of form
108
and substance are politically feasible in that specific context.
To
identify these preferences in the NAAEC/CAFTA-DR context, the liberal theory of international relations—a view that recognizes the in109
ternational ramifications of domestic political actors’ preferences —
proves informative. Under this theory, the preferences expressed by
parties to an international agreement reflect more than the wishes of
the executive or her high-level agents and advisors, but are rather in108

Whether the terms of the CAFTA-DR environmental chapter are politically feasible remains to be seen as the ratification process continues. Because a majority of
the signatories have already ratified the treaty, see supra note 8 and accompanying text,
this Comment will assume its political feasibility. NAAEC is already in force.
109
See generally Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 513 (1997) (“Liberal [international relations]
theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations—the relationship of states to
the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded—have a
fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics.”).
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formed by the domestic political process and the interest groups that
110
compete therein.
As previously noted, most environmentalists prefer international
agreements dealing with the environment to have a contractual
111
form, and NAAEC and CAFTA-DR are no exception. Treating legality as a constant, the meaningful inquiry regarding political feasibility thus involves determining the level of substantive depth deemed
112
acceptable by the contracting states.
Logically, the deepest substance attainable in a multilateral treaty is the greatest depth that is
113
mutually acceptable.
Although this lowest-common-denominator
114
approach contemplates an analysis of each state’s substantive preferences, this Comment’s examination focuses solely on the United
States’s popular and institutional preferences because they prove dis115
positive.
An analysis of U.S. involvement in international environmental
treaties reveals a persistent rejection of international environmental
standards and strong enforcement provisions—both of which are essential to inhibiting the environmental race to the bottom. Beginning
in the 1990s, a U.S. aversion to international environmental standards
began to surface, as indicated by the political fight over the Kyoto Pro110

Id. at 518.
See supra text accompanying note 97 (noting that contracts offer “formality and
perceived security”).
112
See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Raustiala suggests that if pledges became more acceptable, it would be possible to achieve deeper substance in international environmental agreements. Raustiala, supra note 14, at 610 (“By minimizing
concerns about legal compliance, pledges may permit states to negotiate more ambitious and deeper agreements that are tied to stricter monitoring and review provisions.”).
113
The mere fact that each state would agree to a certain level of substantive
depth does not guarantee that this depth will be reflected in the agreement’s provisions. The variables of negotiating skill and the relative distributions of power and interests, inter alia, will affect whether an agreement of the mutually preferred depth will
actually be enacted.
114
Because no party will contract for deeper substantive measures than are preferable, the party with the most shallow preferences will dictate the level of substance that
is politically feasible.
115
This Comment does not go so far as to assert that the United States’s preferences are the shallowest among CAFTA-DR signatories, but it does claim that these
preferences are dispositive because they rule out the possibility of including in CAFTADR explicit substantive provisions that are deep enough to counteract the race to the
bottom as described in Part I, supra. This is not to say that there are no other politically feasible regimes possible, but it does indicate that anything approaching the substantive depth of these politically infeasible alternate provisions will not suffice.
111
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tocol.
Negotiated and signed by the Clinton administration,
Kyoto includes deep substantive provisions explicitly limiting the
118
119
United States’s emission of greenhouse gases.
In response to
120
121
these terms, bipartisan protests in both the House and the Senate
assured President Clinton an embarrassing defeat if he were to send
the Protocol to the Senate for ratification. These protests proved fatal
to any hopes of U.S. ratification, and therefore President Clinton did
not present the Protocol to the Senate; the Bush administration later
122
rejected it as a candidate for ratification.

116

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/
kpeng.pdf [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
117
See Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification (last modified on Dec. 13, 2006),
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/background/status_of_ratification/applicatio
n/pdf/kp_rat_131206.pdf (listing the United States as a signatory as of December 11,
1998, but noting that as of December 13, 2006, it had not yet ratified the Protocol).
118
States who are party to Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, including the United States, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, annex I, May 9, 1992, available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC], would be subject to
more onerous standards under the Kyoto Protocol than non-Annex I states if that protocol were to be adopted, see Kyoto Protocol, supra note 116, arts. 2-8 (listing the responsibilities of Annex I members).
119
The standards established include specific references both to the gases covered
by the Protocol and to state-specific commitment levels:
The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this
Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least
5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 116, art. 3(1). Annex A lists the gases covered: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). Id. annex A. Annex B sets the
U.S. “[q]uantified emission limitation or reduction commitment” at 93% of the “base
year or period.” Id. annex B.
120
H.R. Res. 211, 105th Cong. (1997). This bill failed to emerge from the House
Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, to which it was referred on August 21, 1997. H. Res. 211, Latest Major
Action, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:HE00211:@@@x (last visited
Mar. 23, 2007).
121
S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted). This resolution was adopted by a
vote of 95-0 on July 25, 1997.
S. Res. 98, Latest Major Action,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:SE00098:@@@x (last visited Mar. 23,
2007).
122
See U.S. Won’t Follow Climate Treaty Provisions, Whitman Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
2001, at A19 (recounting then-EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman’s state-
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Notwithstanding its avoidance of deep international environmental standards, the United States has negotiated, signed, and even
ratified treaties that set up strong environmental review structures
such as the citizen submission processes found in both NAAEC and
123
CAFTA-DR.
The enforcement mechanisms attached to these structures, however, maintain the preference for a lack of explicit substan124
tive depth.
NAAEC represents the first such structure to be employed in an American free trade agreement, and provides an
example of the influence domestic interests can have on a state’s international agreements. Mobilized by a domestic environmental
group’s pressure, well-placed members of Congress threatened the
first President Bush’s fast track authority, prompting him to support
125
the inclusion of environmental provisions in that treaty.
Nevertheless, as the NAFTA negotiations drew to a close, the resultant text was

ment that the Bush administration has “‘no interest in implementing that treaty’”).
“Mrs. Whitman repeatedly noted that the Senate voted 95 to 0 against the United
States’ taking any action on climate change unless developing countries also took
measures to reduce their emissions of heat-trapping gases.” Id.
123
Note that Raustiala classifies citizen submission processes, like those found in
NAAEC and CAFTA-DR, as “strong structures.” See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 585
(“Strong structures are those in which a central body issues a specific determination
about a specific party. Such determinations may concern compliance, based either on
the body’s own investigations (a ‘police patrol’ system) or on claims of private actors (a
‘fire alarm’ system).” (citing Raustiala, supra note 9, at 391)).
124
As can be seen in comparing the run-up to NAAEC, see infra notes 125-128 and
accompanying text, with the provisions of the Trade Act of 2002, see infra notes 129-133
and accompanying text, the United States’s substantive preferences have not been stagnant. Even so, the United States has never produced a substantively deep environmental regime.
125
Environmentalists began by transforming the heretofore routine vote on
whether to grant the President “‘fast track’ authority to negotiate the NAFTA” into a
debate over the agreement and its failure to address any environmental consequences.
Frederick W. Mayer, Negotiating the NAFTA: Political Lessons for the FTAA, in GREENING
THE AMERICAS: NAFTA’S LESSONS FOR HEMISPHERIC TRADE 97, 99 (Carolyn L. Deere &
Daniel C. Esty eds., 2002).
Evidencing the environmentalists’ successes, “the two most important figures in
Congress for trade legislation [at the time]—Dan Rostenkowski, chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, and Lloyd Bentsen, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee—sent a letter to the president” notifying him that NAFTA must address the environment if the fast track bill was to pass. Id. at 100. Then-House majority leader Richard Gephardt also protested on behalf of both labor and environmental
interests. Id. The Bush administration responded with an “Action Plan” that promised
to address the environmental concerns in the free trade talks; this plan won over “several major environmental organizations,” but failed to convince others. Id. at 100-01.
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126

bereft of any true environmental substantive depth. After unseating
the incumbent, President Clinton assumed office with NAFTA’s ratification still uncertain, but he soon mollified the environmentalist vot127
ers who had helped elect him by supporting a package deal, which
included a corollary environmental side agreement that would correct
128
NAFTA’s omissions.
Unlike NAFTA, the negotiations of the CAFTA-DR agreement
took place under a pre-existing grant of fast track authority that was
129
not subject to imminent review, thus sparing the second President
Bush from the more difficult legislative check that derailed his fa130
ther’s push for NAFTA ratification.
Since the terms of the Trade
Act of 2002 represent the most recent legislative statement on preferences for environmental provisions in trade agreements prior to
CAFTA-DR’s negotiation, it is illuminating to analyze the terms with
an eye to their substantive content. While establishing no binding parameters for the substantive scope of environmental provisions, the
Trade Act of 2002 lists approved objectives for consideration in the
131
negotiation of trade agreements.
Regarding the environment, the
Trade Act’s substantive recommendations regarding environmental
standards track almost exactly the terms of the CAFTA-DR environ132
mental chapter, but do not suggest a preferred structure or any sub126

See id. at 102-03 (noting that the first Bush administration did make some concessions to the concern of environmental groups during the NAFTA negotiations, but
the final NAFTA environmental standards remained fundamentally shallow and left
many environmental groups far from satisfied).
127
During the presidential campaign, environmental interests “pressed Clinton to
insist on negotiating side agreements to ‘fix’ the NAFTA.” Id. at 103.
128
This side agreement is what eventually became NAAEC. The main players in
weakening the substance of enforcement provisions of the NAAEC’s citizen submission
process were not domestic U.S. interests, but the other negotiating states, Canada and
Mexico. Raustiala, supra note 9, at 399.
129
The Trade Act of 2002 was the fast track provision under which CAFTA-DR was
negotiated, signed, and ratified. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002
§ 2105, 19 U.S.C. § 3805 (Supp. II 2002).
130
The purpose of fast track legislation is to ease the negotiation of international
treaties by temporarily relaxing the constitutional requirement that treaties are subject
to a two-thirds vote of approval by the U.S. Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Usually, the terms of fast track legislation disallow amendments to a treaty under consideration and require only a simple majority vote in both houses. See, e.g., Trade Act of
2002 § 2105 (describing the procedures for congressional approval or disapproval of
trade agreements).
131
See Trade Act of 2002 § 2102(b)(1)-(11) (listing congressional preferences on a
variety of subjects, including labor and the environment).
132
Compare id. § 2102(b)(11)(A)-(B) (recording a legislative preference that states
that are party to a trade agreement be accountable for effective enforcement of their
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133

stantive terms of enforcement. It is true that these provisions do not
necessarily represent the views of both the House and the Senate
when they ratified CAFTA-DR, and that some dissented from both the
134
135
Trade Act and CAFTA-DR on environmental grounds, but the objectors were neither sufficiently influential nor numerous to deepen
the substance of CAFTA-DR.
As evidenced by the recent history of U.S. experience with environmental and trade treaties, the tradeoff between legality and sub136
stance that Raustiala identified has proven true. Each of these attempts at international environmental regulation has either produced
substantively shallow provisions, or failed to gain ratification because
of political infeasibility. Clearly, the United States currently prefers to
deal in international environmental agreements exclusively through
contractual means at the expense of substance.
C. Exemplifying Political Infeasibility
Having demonstrated the parameters of political feasibility, this
Section considers an example of a regime that would likely not win
acceptance in such circumstances. This discussion is meant only to
own environmental laws, but reserving to those states the “discretion with respect to
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions
regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other . . . environmental matters determined to have higher priorities”) with supra Part I.C (explaining that CAFTA-DR member states are given the right to enforce their own environmental laws as well as the right to sacrifice environmental protection in the pursuit of
economic growth).
133
Trade Act of 2002 § 2102(b)(11).
134
See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. H8973 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2001) (statement of Rep.
Hastings) (“Mr. Speaker, I am disappointed that the Trade Promotion Authority, formerly Fast Track, legislation completely ignores the legitimate concerns many people
have raised about the negative impact of current trade policies on working families,
the environment, family farmers, consumers, small- and mid-sized businesses, people
of color and women here in the United States and around the world.”). But see, e.g.,
148 CONG. REC. S9107-08 (2002) (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (statement of Sen. Grassley)
(challenging the notion that the Trade Act of 2002 should require the President to
accept at least parallel environmental terms to those included in the Jordan Free
Trade Agreement).
135
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S7728 (daily ed. June 30, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Levin) (“I am disappointed by the weak labor and environmental provisions included
in CAFTA. Writing labor and environmental standards into trade agreements is an
important way to ensure that free trade is fair trade. But unlike the 2001 Jordan Free
Trade Agreement, CAFTA fails to include internationally recognized, core labor standards.”).
136
See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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illustrate a politically infeasible regime, and by no means argues that
every alternative to the NAAEC/CAFTA-DR environmental regime is
politically infeasible. The intent here is to more concretely describe
characteristics that would remove a regime from the realm of political
feasibility in this context.
A simple and intuitive means of empowering the environmental
interests under NAAEC or CAFTA-DR would be to grant conventional
137
standing in an international forum to those parties who are specifically harmed by an instance of environmental non-enforcement, including individuals, and allow them to make claims against the offend138
ing states for binding relief.
While in some exceptional
international situations regimes of supranational adjudication have
flourished, similar preconditions for their success are absent in most
139
international relationships, and in the NAAEC/CAFTA-DR context,
this solution is politically unworkable.
The archetypal regime of supranational adjudication is the Euro140
pean Union’s (EU) system, headed by the European Court of Jus-

137

Conventional notions of standing include the ability of any individual, on her
own behalf, to be party to a dispute. This ability is a distinguishing factor of what is
termed “supranational” adjudication. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 277 (1997) (defining traditional international adjudication as “the power to adjudicate state-to-state
disputes,” and supranational adjudication as including “cases involving private parties
litigating directly against state governments or against each other”).
138
I limit the scope of consideration here to states as defendants, presuming that
any cases brought against the individuals, natural or juridical, who caused the pollution would be brought in domestic court. Also, instances of environmental nonenforcement, by definition, are perpetrated by state actors.
139
For a heated academic debate concerning the effectiveness of supranational
regimes, see Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 137, at 276 (arguing that the European system, composed of both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR), evidences the possible effectiveness of supranational adjudication); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals,
93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (disputing the effectiveness of “independent tribunals”—
those composed of jurists not beholden to state interests—and asserting that such tribunals “pose a danger to international cooperation because they can render decisions
that conflict with the interests of state parties”); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner & Yoo,
93 CAL. L. REV. 901, 902 (2005) (arguing that independent tribunals play a legitimizing role in international relations and are also constrained by various mechanisms according to states’ wishes); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Reply to Helfer & Slaughter, 93
CAL. L. REV. 957, 958 (2005) (criticizing Helfer and Slaughter’s reliance on the ECJ
and ECHR in deriving a model for a successful international tribunal and noting the
general decline of the ICJ over recent years).
140
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 137, at 387.
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141

tice (ECJ).
Within the subject matter it addresses, the EU example
typifies characteristics common to supranational regimes: legal contractuality, structural strength, and substantive depth. First, the contractual nature of the EU court system derives from its explicit estab142
lishment in the EC Treaty.
Structurally, the ECJ is an appellate
court which is able to hear cases concerning interpretation of the EC
Treaty or the increasingly comprehensive body of European Union
legislation. Certain EU laws have been deemed “directly effective,”
thus allowing the supranational court to hear the claims of individuals
143
concerning these provisions.
Demonstrating the system’s substan144
tive depth, the ECJ issues binding decisions —which are generally
well respected by member state courts—that often find against the in145
terest of an EU member state, thus forcing that state to change its
practice in conformity with the EU legal norm.
However successful supranational adjudication has been for the
EU, to assert a fortiori that the system will win acceptance among the
CAFTA-DR states ignores the obvious gap between what is politically
feasible among EU member states and among the CAFTA-DR signatories. The United States will not likely adopt binding uniform interna-

141

See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
(Treaty of Rome), art. 7, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter EC Treaty]
(establishing the institutions of the European Community, including a “Court of Justice”). The ECJ has the general jurisdiction to “ensure that in the interpretation and
application of [the EC] Treaty the law is observed.” Id. art. 220.
142
See EC Treaty, supra note 141, art. 7 (listing a “Court of Justice” among the
community’s institutions), arts. 220, 225 (establishing the Court of First Instance).
143
See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R 1, 7 (1962) (finding that certain articles of the EC Treaty can be
directly applicable by virtue of the treaty’s establishment of a legal order that is comprised both of states and citizens).
144
See EC Treaty, supra note 141, art. 228, § 1 (“If the Court of Justice finds that a
Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under this Treaty, the State shall be
required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of
Justice.”); id. arts. 244, 256 (establishing the enforceability of ECJ decisions and the
procedures pertaining thereto).
145
See, e.g., Case 115/78, Knoors v. Sec’y of State for Econ. Affairs, 1979 E.C.R.
399, 406, 411 (finding in favor of a Dutch national living in Belgium who appealed the
Netherlands’ decision to deny his application for a Dutch business license in contravention of a Community directive). History has shown that not every member state’s
courts will wholly defer to the ECJ’s judgments. See, e.g., Brunner v. Eur. Union Treaty,
1 C.M.L.R. 57, 79 (1994) (exemplifying the German Federal Constitutional Court’s
deference to the ECJ’s adjudication of individual fundamental rights as long as that
interpretation is consistent with the German constitution).
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146

tional environmental standards, yet a supranational regime would
147
by definition necessitate such a standard.
Additionally, the United
States has shown through its demonstrated preferences that it is not
receptive to international standards that compel action which it would
148
not otherwise be willing to take, as has been the practice in the
149
paradigmatic EU example.
Clearly, a supranational system in the
mode of the EU adopts substantive provisions that are far deeper than
the United States would implement on its own to deal with environmental concerns.
III. ALARMS AND NETWORKS: EXPLICITLY SHALLOW, POTENTIALLY DEEP
As discussed in Part I, a satisfactory solution to the problem of environmental protection would involve both a mechanism for enforcing the citizen submission process and uniform standards of environ150
mental protection.
Part II adds to this analysis the constraint of
political feasibility—the idea that any proposed enforcement mechanisms and uniform standards must be palatable to the preferences of
151
the contracting parties in order to enter into force.
This Part argues that NAAEC and CAFTA-DR provide for systems that, in the
hands of politically astute NGOs, are sufficient to counteract the environmental race to the bottom in such a way as to provide the neces152
sary substantive protections in a politically feasible manner.
The NAAEC and CAFTA-DR citizen submission processes, rather
than serving as court-like means for rights protection and enforcement, act as “fire alarms” that alert the public and signatory govern-

146

See supra notes 116-122 and accompanying text.
The act of making a dichotomous decision sets an international standard with
which the court expects states to comply, whether they actually do or not. See Helfer &
Slaughter, supra note 137, at 289-90.
148
See supra notes 116-122 and accompanying text (describing the unwillingness of
Congress to accept the Kyoto treaty as signed and negotiated by the Clinton administration).
149
Whether or not the EU is representative of other supranational adjudicatory
regimes on this point is up for debate. See supra note 139.
150
See supra Part I.C.
151
See supra Part II.A.
152
This Comment does not claim that this is the only environmental regime that is
sufficient to stem the race to the bottom and achieve political feasibility, but rather
analyzes the treaties’ terms as a vehicle for understanding a possible solution to the
legal-substantive tradeoff. See supra note 115.
147
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153

ments to the need for regulatory change.
It is the province of enterprising NGOs to help trip the alarm by bringing these submissions
in a manner that puts the most political pressure on the member
states to respond. But simply motivating national regulatory reform is
only half the job; haphazard reform alone is no cure for the environmental race to the bottom. Anne-Marie Slaughter provides a theory
for how regulatory networks—groups of domestic environmental min154
155
isters such as CAFTA-DR’s Environmental Affairs Council (EAC)
156
and Environmental Cooperation Commission (ECC) —help harmonize international standards through the generation and dissemination of credible information among the participating government of157
ficials.
Systems such as the citizen submission process can help
encourage harmonization of regulatory approaches by first producing
information regarding specific regulatory failures, thus mobilizing
public support for, and government interest in, addressing the is158
sue.
Slaughter claims that international regulatory networks can
then encourage the state addressing the specific failure to do so in a
manner consistent with the regulatory approaches used in the other
159
network member states.
Harmonization emerges as the regulators,
conforming to the practical advice of their international peers, use
their domestic authority as national-level administrators to implement
160
the new standard international response.

153

See Raustiala, supra note 9, at 389, 393, 398 (classifying the NAAEC submission
procedure as a “review institution” analogous to a “fire alarm”–a decentralized system
that co-opts private watchdogs to alert government institutions to the need for reform).
154
See ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 36-64 (2004) (introducing
the concept of regulatory networks).
155
See supra note 84.
156
See supra note 84.
157
See SLAUGHTER, supra note 154 at 177-78, 187-88 (stressing the role of regulatory networks in generating information critical to government reform); see generally id.
at 1-35 (introducing the author’s theory of state disaggregation and establishing a taxonomy of networks).
158
Id. at 189-91.
159
Id. at 20, 59-61.
160
Id. at 132, 145, 168-69, 178; see also José E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers:
(Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 405, 421 (2003) (citing Christine
Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 21, 30 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (discussing “soft,” or nonbinding, law that
can “guide the application of hard [binding] law”)).
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The following Section analyzes the NAAEC and CAFTA-DR provisions in light of Slaughter’s model. It argues that the treaties incorporate Slaughter’s vision by establishing environmental regimes that
combat the race to the bottom by (1) relying on private entities and
NGOs as a means of identifying regulatory gaps, (2) encouraging institutional change among member states, resulting in a harmonized
approach with broad applicability, and (3) remaining within the
bounds of political feasibility. Because the NAAEC and CAFTA-DR
provisions are functionally identical, the arguments referencing
NAAEC citizen submission cases demonstrate that both treaties have
the capacity to meet this challenge.
A. The Private Right of Action: A Tool for Political Pressure
The aim of the environmental submission process is not to grant
legal recourse for individuals who have suffered an environmental
harm, but to provide a forum that enables private parties to help iden161
tify gaps in state environmental regulations.
Both treaties use the
same procedure, a key component of which grants standing to NGOs
based in any member state to bring claims against member states for
162
environmental non-enforcement.
Two NAAEC factual records,
163
Metales y Derivados (Metales) and Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel,
164
Quintana Roo (Cozumel), show that NGOs can use this standing provision to gain the ear of officials capable of addressing their con165
cerns.

161

CAFTA-DR and NAAEC both provide for claims based on domestic governmental nonenforcement of environmental laws and regulations on the books. CAFTADR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(1); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14(1). Criticism of the submission process based on the lack of institutional change in response to the identified
environmental harm misunderstands the purpose of the submission process itself,
which is merely to identify domestic nonenforcement. See Raustiala, supra note 9, at
389 (defining the role of review institutions in international governance).
162
See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. There is no requirement that
domestic remedies be exhausted before claimants have recourse to either the NAAEC
or CAFTA-DR submission process. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.
163
Secretariat for the N. Am. Comm. for Envtl. Cooperation, Final Factual Record
in re Metales y Derivados, SEM-98-007 (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Metales], available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-7-FFR-e.pdf.
164
Secretariat for the N. Am. Comm. for Envtl. Cooperation, Final Factual Record
in re Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel, Quintana Roo, SEM-96-001 (Oct. 24, 1997)
[hereinafter Cozumel], available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF17D1.PDF.
165
Both of these cases were originally brought by NGOs. See Metales, supra note
163, at 9; Cozumel, supra note 164, at 6. It is important for NGOs motivated by political
goals to instigate submissions, because any individuals who are harmed either physi-
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In Metales, the Environmental Health Coalition and Comité Ciudadano Pro Restauración del Cañón del Padre y Servicios Comunitarios, A.C., brought a submission in response to residents’ complaints
of environmental contamination. They argued to the NAAEC Secretariat that Mexico had failed to “enforce its environmental law effec166
tively in the case of [an] abandoned lead smelter . . . in Tijuana.”
After an investigation, the Secretariat concluded that the waste recy167
cling facility in question had been abandoned, that the residual
168
waste had not been properly sequestered or disposed of, and that
169
the situation endangered both the local ecosystem and human life.
Additionally, the Secretariat found that the plant’s operators had fled
to the United States in order to avoid prosecution under Mexican
170
law.
Although contaminants remained at the site as of 2004, the
171
submission process has helped to publicize the situation.
Similarly, although the Cozumel case did not end the way the complainants would have hoped, NAAEC enabled them to bring widespread public attention to their issue. In that case, controversy arose
over plans to construct a pier, a component of the larger “port terminal project,” when environmental groups learned that the project en172
dangered parts of a coral reef.
The groups claimed that the Mexican government violated its own environmental laws when it failed to
assess the environmental impact of the project prior to commencing
173
construction of the pier.
In the short term, the complainants won
both the public’s attention and a voluntary moratorium on further
construction in the area, pending the outcome of the NAAEC Secre-

cally or financially by a member state’s nonenforcement of its environmental provisions have no substantive remedy available from the submission process, and therefore
little incentive to bring a submission on their own behalf.
166
Metales, supra note 163, at 13; see also Yang, supra note 106, at 444 (noting that
residents of the area complained about the contamination for years).
167
Metales, supra note 163, at 22-23.
168
Id. at 23-24.
169
Id. at 35-40.
170
See id. at 14 (noting that the submission asserted that Mexico is not enforcing
its criminal sanctions against the owners who had fled to the United States).
171
See, e.g., Yang, supra note 106, at 456-57 (acknowledging that the NAAEC submission procedure promoted transparency in the Metales submission, but arguing that
the submission process ultimately failed because it did not sufficiently shame the Mexican government into implementing appropriate reforms to address the problem).
172
Cozumel, supra note 164, at 8-9.
173
Id. at 8-10.
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tariat’s investigation.
Despite the factual record’s finding of evidence that the pier, if completed, would irreparably damage the coral
175
176
reefs, construction resumed after the factual record’s publication.
Given the results of these cases, it is difficult to argue that the
submission system is useful to domestic environmental interests and
not a fruitless exercise. The liberal theory of international relations,
however, makes the political value in such a process more obvious. A
look at the three bases of the liberal theory suggests that any venue for
issue advocacy that garners attention from both the public and officeholders will aid an advocate seeking to enhance her domestic political
standing. First, the liberal theory assumes that “[t]he fundamental ac177
tors in international politics are individuals and private groups,”
who then, according to the theory’s second basic assumption, shape
the political preferences of the state through the domestic political
178
process.
Finally, the theory claims that the aggregate of “interdependent state preferences” instructs the state’s behavior on the inter179
national stage.
Along these lines, Metales and Cozumel show how the
submission process allows environmental groups to formally protest
the regulatory decisions of a state. These claims can be leveraged to
advance the claimants’ domestic political agenda, and therefore affect
governmental preferences and international behavior through the
domestic political process. In both Metales and Cozumel, the claimants,
though dissatisfied with the specific outcomes, used an international
venue to draw attention to their concerns, thus bringing regional and
international pressures to bear on the nonenforcing state. Such international attention can be parlayed into domestic political gains
through skillful public relations techniques, and these gains can be
used to affect both the state’s domestic and international environmental policies.
Whether or not claims of environmental nonenforcement win
immediate remedy from the delinquent state in the specific circumstances giving rise to the submission matters little when compared to
the political value conferred upon the complainant. Even though the
submission process failed to clean up the lead smelter in Metales or
protect the reef in Cozumel, the submissions’ ability to capture the
174
175
176
177
178
179

Graubart, supra note 9, at 437-38.
Cozumel, supra note 164, at 37-38.
Graubart, supra note 9, at 439.
Moravcsik, supra note 109, at 516.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 520.
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public eye, and to use that publicity to push for environmental policy
changes, exemplifies the political pressure the submission process can
afford to domestic environmental interests.
B. Networks and the Harmonization of Environmental Standards
The treaties’ “alarm” function is not the problem critics generally
cite when calling for more effective environmental protections. More
common is the claim that the environmental chapter should provide
binding protections similar to those given to foreign investment and
180
trade interests.
Nevertheless, to view environmental protection as a
court-like proceeding misconstrues the approach adopted in both
CAFTA-DR and NAAEC. Rightly understood, these provisions establish not a forum for international adjudication of legal rights, but a
means for challenging domestic political decisions by raising the issue
181
before an international body of domestic regulators.
In so doing,
the process affords NGOs the opportunity to spur the harmonization
of laws, producing stronger domestic regulations.
Cozumel provides an example of Slaughter’s regulatory networks in
action. The proceedings themselves embarrassed the Mexican government, which agreed to the factual record’s publication only under
heavy pressure from the NAAEC Representatives of the United States
182
and Canada.
Additionally, the media attention that the case won
within Mexico, while failing to derail the pier’s construction, pressured the government into making future environmental concessions.
As Jonathan Graubart notes:
the petition brought considerable international spotlight on faulty environmental practices in Mexico, increased local debate on such matters,
and forced Mexico to improve its oversight procedures with respect to
future developmental projects, making them more transparent. The
Mexican Government did, in fact, promise to improve its laws on pro-

180

See, e.g., Kibel, supra note 5, at 479 (proposing that North American environmental law be enforced on par with North American trade law).
181
In the CAFTA-DR context, this international regulatory network would be the
EAC, CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.5, or the ECC, Environmental Cooperation
Agreement, supra note 84, art. IV, both of which are composed of federal environmental regulators, or their equivalent, from each member state.
182
See Graubart, supra note 9, at 437-38 (noting that the issue became embarrassing for the Mexican government).
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tecting endangered coral reefs and to develop a new environmental plan
183
for the Cozumel island.

Thus the complainants, though unable to achieve a victory in the controversy at issue, were able to use the international submission process
to force the Mexican government to adhere more closely to international norms concerning environmental regulation.
The BC Aboriginal Fisheries Commission et al. (BC Hydro) factual re184
cord also shows how the submission process can achieve international harmonization in environmental regulatory procedures. In this
case, the submission claimed that Canada failed to enforce the Canadian Fisheries Act by allowing BC Hydro to build dams that disrupted
185
protected species’ habitats.
In coordination with this submission,
the claimants publicized the case internationally, and added U.S. co186
sponsors to the complaint.
In the end, the factual record favored
the complainants, questioning the effectiveness of Canada’s enforcement measures embodied in the Water Use Planning Initiative
187
(WUP).
On top of this, the complainants, with the help of diplomatic pressure from the United States, secured assurances from the
Canadian government that would accelerate the WUP’s introduction
188
into force and strengthen its “sanctioning authority.”
From these cases, it is clear that a politically aware environmentalist group can use the submission process as a coercive lobbying tool to
bring an unwanted spotlight upon government officials. By harnessing peer pressure from other environmental regulators, the process
can produce a uniform international standard for environmental pro-

183

Id. at 439 (internal citations omitted).
Secretariat for the N. Am. Comm. for Envtl. Cooperation, Final Factual Record
in re BC Aboriginal Fisheries Comm. et al., SEM-97-001, at 4 (May 30, 2000)
[hereinafter
BC
Hydro],
available
at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/
BC-Hydr-Fact-record_en.pdf (recounting the submission’s allegation that BC Hydro
“‘consistently and routinely violated [federal Fisheries Act] section 35(1)’”).
185
Id. at 1 (recording a submission brought on behalf of NGOs, including the
Trail Wildlife Association, the Sierra Club, and the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Association, inter alia).
186
See Graubart, supra note 9, at 440-41 (describing the use of American cosubmitters “including the national Sierra Club in hopes of attracting greater international attention”).
187
BC Hydro, supra note 184, at 111-12; see also Graubart, supra note 9, at 442. The
WUP is a Canadian regulatory instrument dealing with water use and fish habitats. BC
Hydro, supra note 184, at 11-12.
188
See Graubart, supra note 9, at 443 (noting that the public attention “helped
spur the government into instituting the WUP process and in giving it more sanctioning authority”).
184
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tection. Furthermore, it is dangerous to view environmental regulation as a “product” rather than a “process” because regulation “is not
fully contained in the statutory text; it is the complex outcome of the
interaction between agency implementation, private-party challenges,
189
judicial interpretation, and legislative reaction.”
To impose courtlike enforcement powers against states for failing to prosecute every
instance of environmental noncompliance is to be ignorant of the iterative regulatory process. Indeed, even within the United States,
nonenforcement routinely prevails in the name of practical expedi190
ency and optimistic legislative goal setting.
A powerful supranational agency, wielding powerful investigative and sanctioning abilities, will not induce compliance by the states subject to its oversight.
Rather, it will encourage those states to shrink the scope of their domestic environmental regulations in order to prevent liability, result191
ing in an overall decrease in substantive environmental protection.
In sum, the environmental submission processes found in the
NAAEC and CAFTA-DR treaties establish a means of giving effect to
domestic regulation in a political atmosphere. The tools available to
potential claimants have the power to instigate harmonization by challenging domestic practices that operate below the international norm.
Once secured, these reforms will affect not only the complainants
themselves, but will apply throughout the legal regime.
C. Networks and Political Feasibility
The innovation of the “alarms and networks” system of environmental enforcement is one of political feasibility. As noted in Part II,
the legal-substantive tradeoff indicates that environmental treaties
usually have substantively shallow provisions. Given that the NAAEC
192
and CAFTA-DR signatories have already chosen to implement explicitly shallow provisions, the question then becomes whether the
post-ratification deepening of the treaties’ substance remains politically feasible. This Section argues that the networked system and its
189

Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA
Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31, 4849 (1995).
190
See id. at 51 (citing the persistent nonattainment of emissions standards in Los
Angeles).
191
See id. at 52 (arguing that the use of a supranational agency like the CEC would
encourage Congress to reduce the scope of its environmental laws).
192
Recall that not all signatories have ratified CAFTA-DR, see supra note 8.
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use of domestically accountable officials, combined with the
NAAEC/CAFTA-DR Secretariats’ respect for state sovereignty, ensure
that the regulatory changes the system produces will be domestically
legitimate.
The beauty of regulatory networks is that their composition provides democratic accountability: these networks are composed of state
officials who already control a specific sector of the domestic govern193
ment.
By treating agency heads and cabinet-level officials as the
chief diplomatic officers within their substantive policy areas, Slaughter argues, states can “ensur[e] that transgovernmental networks are
subject to at least the same checks and balances as national officials
194
acting within national territory.”
In the same way that the networks
co-opt regulators’ authority to implement regulatory harmonization,
they benefit from the accountability that those same regulators owe to
195
their state governments.
A complicating factor in the case of
CAFTA-DR is the possibility that not all member states may have sufficient regulatory infrastructures to be represented in such networks in
196
the first place.
Answering this deficiency, the CAFTA-DR talks
themselves have produced regulatory advancement among the negotiating parties, such that Central American states lacking the equivalent of a cabinet-level environmental minister have established interim
regimes through which Slaughter’s networked governance can oper197
ate.

193

See SLAUGHTER, supra note 154, at 231 (arguing that if governments send their
own appointed or elected officials to serve on these transnational networks, then they
will be accepting of the networks’ output because of the retention of state accountability). Such is the case with both the EAC and the ECC. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1,
art. 17.5; Environmental Cooperation Agreement, supra note 84, art. IV.
194
SLAUGHTER, supra note 154, at 231.
195
See id. at 232-33 (“[O]ne set of government officials operates at both the national and global-regional levels performing a set of interrelated functions, but these
officials would have to represent both national and global interests . . . .”). Kenneth
Anderson challenges Slaughter’s conception of accountability in the context of transgovernmental regulatory networks. See Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1255, 1303 (2005) (book review) (“But plainly the argument of A New World Order
depends crucially on judges and bureaucrats—unelected and, at best, only partially
democratically accountable actors—relying on their own perception of their authority
in order to bind the states of which they are nominally a part.”).
196
See Graubert, supra note 9, at 437-38 (giving an example of Mexico’s insufficient regulatory infrastructure).
197
See Implementation of the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 14, 21 (2005) (statement of
the Hon. Peter F. Allgeier, Acting U.S. Trade Rep., Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep.)
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In addition to the network’s accountability, the Secretariat’s use of
discretion has demonstrated, in the context of NAAEC, that the submission process can operate in a manner respectful of state sovereignty. Raustiala argues that, in refusing to investigate two specific
submissions, the Secretariat made “sound” decisions that evinced a
“politically astute” understanding of the submission process’s relation
198
199
to domestic regulatory methods.
Both the Biodiversity Submission
200
and the Sierra Club Submission challenged legislative amendments to
U.S. environmental laws as, in effect, failures to enforce the preexist201
ing environmental standards.
In each instance, the Secretariat decided to forego investigation of these rollbacks, noting that subsequent environmental legislation that diminishes the effectiveness of
existing environmental law will not be considered a failure to en202
force.
Raustiala points out that these decisions rightly interpret the

(“Nicaragua has created a new office on trade and environment within its environment
ministry as the result of the CAFTA, while El Salvador has established a new advisory
committee on trade and environment issues, with NGOs on the committee, very much
like our own Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC). In fact,
the Environment Chapter requires all of the CAFTA-DR countries to establish such
advisory committees.”). The terms to which the signatories have agreed include the
assurance that there will be meetings among cabinet-level environmental regulators,
and that each state will establish an environmental consultative or advisory committee
to implement environmental regulations. CAFTA-DR supra note 1, art. 17.5, 17.6(3).
198
See Kal Raustiala, International “Enforcement of Enforcement” Under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 721, 722-23 (1996) (“The
analysis herein supports the [CEC] Secretariat’s responses, arguing that the decisions
are sound, both under the terms of the Agreement and under the separation of powers doctrine of the United States. Moreover, as this Article argues, the decisions
handed down by the Secretariat are politically astute . . . .”).
199
Secretariat for the N. Am. Comm. for Envtl. Cooperation, Petition Pursuant to
Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, at 6, SEM-95-001
(June 30, 1995) (submitted by Jay Tutchton, Earthlaw), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/95-1-SUB-EO.pdf [hereinafter Biodiversity Submission] (claiming that the United States “cannot simply halt enforcement of the ESA . . .
without violating its obligations under the NAAEC”).
200
Secretariat for the N. Am. Comm. for Envtl. Cooperation, Submission Pursuant to
Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation on the U.S. Logging
Rider, at 1, SEM-95-002 (Aug. 30, 1995) (submitted by Patti A. Goldman, Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF151.pdf
[hereinafter Sierra Club Submission] (arguing that the U.S. government failed to enforce its environmental laws governing logging on federal lands).
201
Biodiversity Submission, supra note 199, at 4; Sierra Club Submission, supra note
200, at 3.
202
See Secretariat for the N. Am. Comm. for Envtl. Cooperation, Secretariat’s Determination Pursuant to Articles 14 & 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, at 4-5, SEM-95-002 (Dec. 8, 1995), available at www.cec.org/files/pdf/
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203

terms of NAAEC, and also reflect the correct understanding of environmental regulation as an iterative process that cannot be easily
204
separated from legislative action.
In this way, both the submission
process and the officials managing the process respect the sovereignty
of the signatory states. Such respect does not weaken the process, but
rather strengthens it, because the international regime cannot function without the cooperation of its constituent governments.
As the NAAEC process demonstrates, the submission procedure,
in upholding standards of environmental protection, must rely on
both the internal legitimacy of networking officials as well as the selflimiting discretion of the institutions.
CONCLUSION
CAFTA-DR provides for a networked solution to the international
environmental regulatory problem. The treaty’s provisions have the
potential to combat the diminution of environmental standards that
might otherwise occur as a result of the increased international investment and trade that NAFTA and CAFTA-DR intend to achieve. In
doing so, the submission process and regulatory network provide a
system of international accountability that can use private actors to instigate proceedings, which produces the harmonization of standards
in a politically acceptable manner. This system provides shrewd environmentalists an instrument for enhancing their domestic political
status as a means to effect regulatory change.

sem/95-2-DET-OE.pdf (“Where the new law explicitly exempts, modifies, or waives
provisions of an earlier law—enacted law will prevail.”); Letter from Victor Lichtinger,
Executive Director, Comm. For Envtl. Cooperation, to Jay Tutchton, Staff Attorney,
Earthlaw 4-6 (Sept. 21, 1995), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/
95-1-DET-E1.PDF (“[T]he provisions of Article 14 are most logically triggered when a
failure to enforce is brought about by administrative shortcomings rather than legislative mandates.”).
203
See Raustiala, supra note 198, at 757 (arguing that in rejecting these submissions, the Secretariat rightly read NAAEC to exclude claims against congressional “rescissions bills and their attendant riders” despite the danger this legislation poses to
the environment).
204
See id. at 758 (“In the complex regulatory system, enforcement cannot be readily separated from lawmaking in practice. In the United States, administrative agencies
engage in both lawmaking and enforcement as part and parcel of the modern administrative state.”).

